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Abstract
This paper examines the almost ineradicable misconception of Wittgenstein's alleged 
antagonism to science as evidenced through some characteristic disparaging 
comments by world-renowned scientists, notably by Anton Zeilinger. Above all, he 
criticizes Wittgenstein on the basis of the opening sentence of the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, "The world is all that is the case", which he regards as expressing 
*"the naive world-view"* of a *"typical philosopher of classical physics"*.1 He 
proposes an extension in agreement with the findings of quantum theory, namely by 
the clause *"… and all that can be the case"* (Zeilinger 2003, 231).
It will become apparent, however, that this amplification is redundant, that 
Wittgenstein was in tune with modern physics, that a surprising number of his 
philosophical concepts are in agreement with it, and that various quantum pundits 
consider them to be relevant.
Keywords: Wittgenstein, Tractatus , science versus philosophy, relativity theory, 
quantum physics, Zeilinger
"[Wittgenstein] has often been accused of engaging in a priori armchair
science, but would respond that it is scientistic philosophers who engage
 in an incoherent discipline – empirical metaphysics." (Glock 2005, 295 f.) 
1. Why Wittgenstein? Why Zeilinger?
In the recent past, a number of scientists have chided philosophy, notably
contemporary philosophy, for its inefficiency and irrelevancy, thus triggering a series
of lively debates in which most of their criticisms were refuted, and often brilliantly 
so.2
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In this context, a mere glance at the Anglosphere will bring to mind at least three 
luminaries singling out Wittgenstein to illustrate their assaults on philosophy: 
Stephen Hawking, Steven Weinberg, and Lawrence Krauss.
In his "Brief History of Time" (Hawking 1988, 191) Hawking proclaims: "[…] in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, science became too technical and mathematical 
for the philosophers, or anyone else except a few specialists. Philosophers reduced 
the scope of their inquiries so much that Wittgenstein, the most famous philosopher 
of this century, said, 'The sole remaining task for philosophy is the analysis of 
language.' What a comedown from the great tradition of philosophy from Aristotle to 
Kant!" This, however, is an oversimplification. Glock concedes that "[t]his picture 
seems to impoverish philosophy, and is generally considered to be the weakest part of 
Wittgenstein's later work […]". But these are "slogans unsupported by argument […]. 
Wittgenstein's methodological views must ultimately be judged by their results" 
(Glock 2005, 294 f.) - which have been manifold and far-reaching. 
In response, one could point out to Hawking that even in the quantum realm
Wittgenstein's philosophy can be put to considerable use – see, e.g., the four 
examples in Section 8 of this paper.
Or one could answer Hawking's reproach by means of a comparison with the German 
academics of the Weimar epoch, the heroic age of quantum physics: "Culturally, a 
truly great scientist was expected not only to make discoveries in a special field of 
research, but […] to contribute a general philosophical outlook […], transcending 
narrow professionalism and disciplinary boundaries." (Kojevnikov 2011, 344) The 
ideal was the comprehensively educated Universalgelehrte. What a comedown since 
then!
(In "The Grand Design" (2010, 5) Hawking famously even raises the stakes: "[…] 
philosophy is dead. Philosophy has not kept up with modern developments in 
science, particularly physics" – this time, however, without making reference to 
Wittgenstein.)
Referring to Tractatus 6.371, Steven Weinberg (1994, 28f.), in utter dismissal of 
Wittgenstein's (and not only his!) thinking, has this to say: "Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
denying even the possibility of explaining any fact on the basis of any other fact, 
warned that 'at the basis of the whole modern view of the world lies the illusion that 
the so-called laws of nat. are the explanations of natural phenomena' […]. Such 
warnings leave me cold." To which Wittgenstein – through Schlick ("I owe this idea 
and terminology to Ludwig Wittgenstein.") – might, e.g., answer: "[A]t bottom a law 
of nature does not even have the logical character of an 'assertion', but represents, 
rather, 'a prescription for the making of assertions' " (Schlick 1979, 188); or, with 
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John A.Wheeler's idea "that physical laws could not appear in a truly fundamental 
description of nature […] - [h]ence the expression 'law without law' ". (Deutsch 1986, 
565)
Also Lawrence Krauss, cosmologist and popular-science writer, generated a 
controversy by making some disparaging remarks about philosophy in "A Universe 
From Nothing: Why There Is Something Rather than Nothing" (2012). Under 
pressure during a subsequent interview by his interlocutor's statement that "computer 
science […] was to a large degree built on foundational work done by philosophers in 
logic and other formal languages" (Anderson 2012), he tried to relativize his 
judgements, for instance by claiming that Wittgenstein did not really do philosophy at 
all and that his pioneering work in the Tractatus had no influence on the development 
of informatics: "In the case of descriptive philosophy you have literature or logic, 
which in my view is really mathematics, and there are philosophers like Wittgenstein 
that are very mathematical, but what they're really doing is mathematics – it's not 
talking about things that have affected computer science, it's mathematical logic." 
 
This is not the place to rehash these debates. But the question arises to what factors 
Wittgenstein owes the unsolicited honour of representing 20th century philosophy in 
suchlike debates, particularly among the philosophically underinformed. It may 
safely be assumed that the reason cannot be found in the involved scientists' 
penetrating analyses and their deep knowledge of his works. Can it be found in a 
desire for self-aggrandizement by claiming intellectual superiority over the "most 
famous philosopher" (Hawking, see above) of the 20th century? Or is it simply a 
result of his lasting or even proliferating iconic status in art, music, and literature 
(which is probably also due to external factors such as family background, biography, 
eccentricity, charisma)? Or is it that a blow to him, the alleged "archfiend of science", 
will at the same time discredit the whole field of activity from which, after all, his 
"antagonism" purportedly sprang? Be that as it may, this paper will focus on two 
pronouncements on Wittgenstein by Anton Zeilinger.
Zeilinger – and his motives? – seem to differ fundamentally from the aforementioned: 
He has repeatedly published (e.g., "On the Interpretation and Philosophical 
Foundation of Quantum Mechanics", 1996) and been interviewed on the 
philosophical implications of his work, saying, e.g.: "I have a program where I invite 
philosophers to see what goes on in the lab" (Powell 2011). He regards philosophy as 
very significant for bringing together diverse strains of thought and areas of life, and 
he expressly regrets the fact *"that the philosophical aspects of the natural sciences 
have fallen behind by the shift of the natural sciences to the USA"*. (Zeilinger 2002). 
 
And yet he excoriates the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Why?
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"Ludwig Wittgenstein is a quantum (manifold) thinker."
(Blum 2006, 176)
"The idea that the world is composed of facts, not of things, was formulated in philosophy
before quantum mechanics. Namely, in 1918 Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote his famous theses:
'1 The world is all that is the case. 1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.' "
(Ingarden 2000, 36)
2. Evolution of a prejudice
There is no denying that attitudes like those described in Section 1 were fostered and 
cherished well into the 2000s, even in professional publications on philosophy, 
despite Wittgenstein's pervasive background in engineering and in flagrant disregard 
of all the information meanwhile available: 
"[…] if he had taken an interest in the monumental struggles taking place in 
contemporary science over quantum physics […]" (MacFarlane 2001)
*"Obviously he did not know modern physics!"* (Fröhlich 2007, 98)
"[H]e did not know modern science." (Stenholm 2011, 5)
"Wittgenstein does not seem to have been impressed by relativity theory and the 
beginnings of quantum mechanics […]." (Baltas 2012, 254)
This permeant preconception – which neglects the fact that he "had studied science 
and engineering and appreciated the rigor and sharpness of the scientific way of 
thinking" (Kindi 2017, 589) – is certainly a consequence of Wittgenstein's methodical 
criticism of "the ideological use of science, of the pretensions of scientists to offer 
authoritative judgments on all kinds of issues and of reducing any problem to a 
scientific one." (ibid., 589) Moreover, some of his own statements were prone to mis- 
or overinterpretation, e.g.:
"I may find scientific questions interesting, but they never really grip me. Only 
conceptual and aesthetic questions do that. At bottom I am indifferent to the solution 
of scientific problems; but not of the other sort." (CV 1980, 79)
Kuusela justly states that "the record for Wittgenstein's views on science should be 
corrected".³ But in Glock/Hyman's "A Companion to Wittgenstein" (2017), the "most 
comprehensive survey of Wittgenstein's thought yet compiled" (Wiley-Blackwell's 
advertising slogan), his position concerning 20th century physics is not a topic. Even 
admirers of Wittgenstein, such as Ray Monk, his foremost biographer, have their 
share of disseminating the kind of misconceptions quoted above: In his classic, "The 
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Duty of Genius", he hardly mentions science or scientists, even if they played a 
substantial role in Wittgenstein's life – with the exception of Boltzmann (p. 26 = 
once!) and Hertz (pp. 26 & 446 = twice!). Moritz Schlick, philosophical propagator 
of the theory of relativity and proficient commentator on the developments in 
quantum theory, is presented as "Professor of Philosophy at the Vienna University" 
(Monk 1991, 241), when actually he occupied the chair of "Naturphilosophie", 
previously held by Mach and Boltzmann (specially created for Mach as "Chair for the 
Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences"). There is only one entry on the topic of 
science in the index, namely "science: L.W.'s antagonism to" (Monk 1991, 652), 
which, however, in all cases refers to Wittgenstein's attacks on scientism, not on 
science! (Nordmann, by contrast, in an attempt to solve the conundrum of how 
Wittgenstein became a philosopher rather than an engineer, audaciously "inverts the 
perspective" (Nordmann 2002, 357) and suggests: "Perhaps, Wittgenstein never 
became a philosopher but was always a scientist or engineer.") 
And then, of course, there are Wittgenstein's opponents, notably his detractor Ernest 
Gellner, who railed against everything Wittgensteinian, and above all against "his 
rejection of the positivist idea that philosophy is essentially linked to science […], 
i.e., either as substantially continuous with it […] or methodologically as Russell and 
the Vienna Circle believed." (Janik 2001, 148) Although "[t]he view that the later 
Wittgenstein is fundamentally anti-scientific turns out to be profoundly inaccurate" 
(Janik 2001, 148), Gellner "[i]n effect […] views Wittgenstein as hostile to the 
scientific world-view" (Skalnik 2003, 218). As a consequence, "[d]espite major 
alterations in our picture of Wittgenstein in the intervening years a shocking number 
of philosophers (and others) have retained Gellner‘s image to this day." (Janik 2001, 
148) Neither clarifying statements by distinguished experts such as Rupert Read 
("Wittgenstein has been widely misunderstood as hostile to science. What 
Wittgenstein was in fact hostile to is only scientism." Read 2012, 185) nor attempts to 
rehabilitate Wittgenstein by presenting "resources for countering the still prevalent 
view that he [was] disconnected from the progress of serious science" (Stenlund 
2015, Abstract) have been sufficiently apprehended yet. Rather, this misconception is 
still gaining ground, stimulated by various allegations of prominent scientists – which 
is to be illustrated by means of the case study announced above.
3. Zeilinger's pronouncement
Zeilinger's bestselling popular-science introduction to quantum physics, "Einsteins 
Schleier. Die neue Welt der Quantenphysik" (2003),4 culminates in a pointed Parthian 
shot at a defenceless last-page newcomer to the treatise:
*"Wittgenstein opens his famous Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus with the sentence:
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'1.1 The world is all that is the case.'5 
We have seen that this viewpoint is too narrow.6 In quantum physics we cannot only 
make statements on what is the case but also statements on what can be the case. […] 
But these predictions about the future are statements about everything that could be 
the case. Needless to say, these statements are also part of the world.
Therefore, the world is more than what Wittgenstein thought. The world is all that is 
the case, and all that can be the case."* [Zeilinger's italics] (Zeilinger 2003, 231)
On Nov. 9, 2011, in the Austrian daily Der Standard, Zeilinger's lecture at a 
symposium hosted by the Austrian Academy of Sciences on occasion of the 60th 
anniversary of Wittgenstein's death was summarized as follows:
*"Naive world-view
Wittgenstein's explanation of the world in the very first sentence of the 
'Tractatus' ('The world is all that is the case') was critically viewed by the 
experimental physicist, Anton Zeilinger, already in his book 'Einsteins 
Schleier'. Zeilinger calls it a 'naive world-view' of a 'typical philosopher of 
classical physics'. In the light of quantum physics, with which Wittgenstein 
never occupied himself, Zeilinger proposed a revision of this sentence: 'The 
world is all that is the case and all that can be the case.' (APA)"*7
A look on the internet will show that both the less polished precursor versions of this 
sentence and the pithy final one have been well received among quantum physicists 
but never directly challenged.8 Ironically, however, at least two physicist-
philosophers – both of them critical of Zeilinger's quantum philosophy – have 
perceived some unintended similarities between Zeilinger's postulates of his 
"foundational principle for quantum mechanics" (Zeilinger 1999b) and some 
Tractarian notions, namely Timpson (see below, Annotation 13) and Jaeger, who 
especially points to (the unaltered!) propositions 1 and 1.1 in connection with 
Zeilinger's elucidations, which thus inadvertently confirm the basic suitability of 
some aspects of the Tractatus for quantum theoretical deliberations (see also Section 
8 of this paper):
"An obvious way of approaching this picture [Author's note: i.e., Zeilinger's position] 
is to compare it with the ideas of the early Wittgenstein, in which 'the world is 
everything that is the case' and 'the totality of facts, not of things.' " (Jaeger 2009, 
236)
So it seems, then, that Wittgenstein's influence on the thinking of modern physics – 
substantial in the opinion of experts, though perhaps negligible in the eyes of sceptics 
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– is, in the last analysis, at least strong enough for a subliminal impact even on his 
critics.
In the next two sections, Zeilinger's claim will be subjected to further critical scrutiny 
on the basis of the Tractatus and of Wittgenstein's biography.
Topics will cover his early years in Boltzmann's Vienna, then his study 
in Planck's (and then Einstein's) Berlin, then his move to Rutherford's 
Manchester and eventually his arrival to join the cohort of 
great physicists in Cambridge in the 1930s and 1940s.“
(Preview HAPP-Conference „Wittgenstein and Physics“, Oxford 2014)
4. Wittgenstein and Einstein
In his autobiography, "Ex-Prodigy, My Childhood and Youth", N. Wiener reminisces 
about how Russell was one of the first philosophers to understand the significance of 
Einstein's work, and how he was introduced to relativity theory in a course of Russell 
in 1913 (Wiener 1953, 191, 200). And in 1914 and 1915, Russell kept "referring to 
the theory of relativity (OKEW 89, RSDP 159, and SMP 114) and to the principle of 
relativity (OKEW 104 & 242, and UCM 135)". (Desmot 2010, 195) This is, of 
course, merely circumstantial evidence, but it would certainly be preposterous to 
think that Russell and Wittgenstein, in all of their intense discussions between 1911 
and the beginning of the First World War, should have completely shunned the topic 
of relativity. 
For the years after the First World War, however, beginning with November 1919 – 
"Wittgenstein must certainly have been impressed by the confirmation of Einstein's 
Relativity Theory […]: most newspapers in Europe had front-page headlines" (Penco 
2010, 2 resp. 361) – Penco marshals detailed evidence: analogies between relativity 
theory and Wittgenstein's philosophy, plus historical and, above all, robust textual 
documentation!
By all accounts, Wittgenstein was a very intense listener (Schulte, 1989, 11, footnote 
4), and in his environment in Vienna and Cambridge "many people were discussing 
Relativity Theory, particularly his friends, from Schlick to Russell" (Penco 2010, 2). 
The Einstein-Schlick correspondence shows how highly Einstein valued Schlick‘s 
interpretations of his theory. Penco concludes that "there was a profound connection 
between Wittgenstein and relativity theory" (Penco 2010, Abstract). To support his 
claim that Wittgenstein took special care to show that he was "in tune with Relativity 
Theory" (Penco 2010, 1 resp. 360), he looks at an "abundance of citation" in the 
Nachlass, "repeated many times between 1929 and 1950" (Penco 2010, 4):
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"In the Nachlass there are numerous 'robust' sentences (sentences that are repeated in 
different contexts at different times), which also applies to "the subject of Einstein 
and Relativity Theory[…]:
Mainly from '29 until '33:
[Author's note: In the following examples, only the English translations will be cited.]
(1) […] (In the 'not being able to go beyond themselves' we find the similarity 
between my observations and those of Relativity Theory) [Ms 108 p.270-71, Ms 210, 
p.70; Ms 212, p.985, TS 212: 985; Big Typescript: § 76, p.356].
(2) […] ('Einstein: how a magnitude is measured is what it is') [Ms 107, p.143: Ms 
113, p.142; Ms 130, p.241; […].
From '41 onwards:
(3) […] (This is the similarity of my treatment with relativity theory, that is, so to 
speak, a consideration about the clocks with which we compare events) [Ms 164: 82; 
RFM VI: §28; cfr. UG: 303-305]" (Penco 2010, 3 f.)
In a comment on quotation (1) above, he points out that the beginnings of an evolving 
connection between relativity theory and Wittgenstein's thinking may be discernible 
already in the Tractatus: "Actually this remark seems apparently linked to the main 
ideas of the Tractatus, with its anti-metalinguistic attitude. […] it helps to show our 
philosopher continuously re-shaping his interpretation of the connection between 
Einstein and his evolving ideas […]. It seems that Wittgenstein, fascinated by the 
most significant discovery of the century, tries to stay in touch with it while 
developing his own ideas." (Penco 2010, 11 f.)
In a similar vein, Kusch (2011) compares some of Einstein's and Wittgenstein's views 
in and after the late 1920s, with a focus on clock-coordination and metrology, in 
order to gain new interpretational perspectives and additional insights into some of 
Wittgenstein's central ideas and themes, notably with regard to On Certainty and to 
his considerations on rule-following.
In the face of such impressive evidence on the topic of Relativity it becomes 
irrefutably clear that Wittgenstein, even if he had ignored quantum theory, can 
definitely no longer be disparaged as a "naive philosopher of classical physics".
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*"It can't be possible –"
"Actuality is always the finest proof of possibility."*
Johann Nepomuk Nestroy, Der Talisman/*The Talisman*, 
Act Three/Scene 18
5. Wittgenstein and quantum physics: the (pre-)Tractarian years
There are, as already indicated (see above, Section 3), certain affinities between 
quantum physics and the Tractatus, which will come as a surprise to many. In this 
context two caveats must, however, be heeded: In his physical description of the 
world, Wittgenstein did not aim to extol "die aktuell bessere Theorie" (Kokai 2005), 
i.e., the currently better theory, but to bring out the "network character" of physical 
theories; and the world of the Tractatus must by no means be equated with the world 
of physics, which solely concerns the universe, i.e., a mere "ontological province" 
(Gabriel 2013, 51). The Tractatus, by contrast, deals with "a constellation of 
Fragestellungen" (Brock 2016, 189), i.e., with a whole range of very diverse spheres 
such as "[m]etaphysics, logic, sentence, truth operations, mathematics, natural 
science, non-sense shown, ethical, mystical, human life" (ibid., 190). His "world" is 
more than physics: It is to be imagined as *"logical form, but not as a realm of mere 
ideas, untouched by everything material"* (Goppelsröder 2007, 19).
For Wittgenstein's years in Einstein's Berlin and in Rutherford's Manchester, no 
indication could be found that he occupied himself with quantum physics. In 1912, 
just a few months after his arrival in Cambridge in October 1911, he began his work 
on the Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung. The situation of modern physics was 
much better there than in Vienna, at whose university the chairman of the Institute of 
Physics, Ernst Lecher, rejected the first quantum mechanical atomic model (by Arthur 
Haas) as a *"carnival joke"* (Flamm 2001), whereas Cambridge was already a centre 
of theoretical work on the structure of atoms and molecules, and therefore Niels Bohr 
chose it as his sojourn for about half a year, from September 1911 to March 1912. In 
that year, the quantum issue was still unresolved and declared by Einstein to be the 
central problem of physics. "Quantum theory as we know it began with Bohr's 
formulation around 1913" (McCrea 1985) – in Manchester, which Wittgenstein had 
left in 1911. But in order to avoid an ahistorical perspective, it should be kept in mind 
that the "Tractatus was written in the days of the old Quantum Theory. The new 
Quantum Theory, with its challenge to Newtonian Mechanics had not yet arrived" 
(Young 2004, 130), and that *"in their time of origin, the revolutionary theories that 
shaped the new conception of the world in the 1920s, the theory of relativity and 
quantum theory, were rather part of a consolidation programme […] on a higher level 
of reflection"* (Heidelberger 2002, 84), i.e., initially these developments in physics 
were seen as a process, not as a revolution. 9 So it would almost constitute an 
anachronism to demand a deep knowledge of (the early) quantum theories from a 
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Viennese philosopher of that time. And yet, already in the Tractatus there are some, 
as it were, quantum physical trains of thought, apparently developed in accordance 
with Boltzmann's thinking: "With the new emphasis on statistical explanation 
characteristic of quantum mechanics, the importance of Boltzmann's method has only 
increased. In particular, his method of specifying the physical state of a system, by 
reference to a multi-dimensional space whose coordinates represent all the 
independent variables of the system, has been taken over entirely into the standard 
presentations of modern quantum theory." (Janik 1973, 144) Boltzmann's "space of 
theoretical possibilities", which played the key role in "Boltzmann's statistical method 
of analysis" (ibid.), corresponds perfectly to paragraphs 1.13, 1.2, 1.21, 2.1, 2.201, 
3.4, 3.411 of the Tractatus. "It was no accident that Wittgenstein's Tractatus was 
required reading in Schlick's Vienna Circle of philosophically minded scientists and 
scientifically minded philosophers." (Yourgrau 2006, 39)
6. Quantum theory and Wittgenstein's philosophy: further affinities 
There are some remarkable studies on the value of Wittgenstein's philosophy of 
language – "Every question, whether concerning philosophy or science, is expressed 
in a language. Every answer, even when based upon experiment, must use logic." 
(Omnès 1994, 520) – for the description of quantum physics, and some (see 
especially Omnès 1995, 1ff.) that juxtapose Wittgenstein's concepts with 
complementary views of Bohr and Heisenberg. Not all of them start from valid 
premises, not even Stenholm's basically profound comparison between Bohr and 
Wittgenstein: "It is argued that many of the features of Wittgenstein's later work 
could have been applied to quantum physics, if only he had known about this", but 
alas, "he did not know modern science" (Stenholm 2011, 5) – which is wrong (see, 
e.g., MS 105 as quoted in Section 7 of the paper in hand). So, Stenholm's starting 
point is his firm belief that Wittgenstein was a philosopher of classical physics, and 
he looks at his work under this preconception, resulting in a vicious hermeneutic 
circle. For instance, his method of approaching the Tractatus is "to paraphrase this 
work so that it can be directly applied to such an interpretation" (Stenholm 2011, 
183). In the chapter "Wittgenstein and physics" (ibid., 189 ff.), he presents "relevant 
statements from several of his published books", on the basis of which "[r]elations to 
modern physics are pointed out […]". It would be interesting to know what 
conclusions he would have drawn without the all-pervading bias that any correlations 
whatsoever must needs be purely coincidental.10
In the following, Stenholm's concept will be challenged by several examples that 
point to the contrary: three approving interpretations of Wittgenstein's thought in this 
section (to begin with, by means of a fresh glance at the history of early quantum 
theory), and then a look at circumstantial and archival evidence in Section 7.
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For Steen Brock, the new era of physics begins with Helmholtz, Hertz, and 
Boltzmann:
„I explain in my thesis [Niels Bohr's Philosophy of Quantum Physics in the Light of 
the Helmholtzian Tradition of Theoretical Physics, 2003], both relativity theory and 
early quantum theory made use of The Principle of Least Action [6.3211] in order to 
regulate the possible set of phase-spaces (logical spaces) available in the formation of 
a new theory. […] the author of the TLP did not view physics with 'classical eyes'. 
[…] The TLP was indeed a radical work almost preceding what actually happened.“11
Bezerra furnishes examples of "concepts shared by Tractatus and quantum 
mechanics" (2015, 26 ff.) by juxtaposing quotations from Bohr, Dirac, Pauli, 
Feynman, and Schrödinger on possibility, probability, the exclusion principle, 
quantum entanglement, the uncertainty principle, the structure of the "quantum 
world", and the Schrödinger equation with sentences from the Tractatus. By means of 
these affinities he manages to reveal an intellectual and philosophical "entanglement" 
between the Tractatus and quantum physics. For him, this is not an "amazing 
coincidence", but due to the impact of the prevailing Zeitgeist plus Wittgenstein's 
intellectual alertness and brilliance, i.e., to the fact that "Wittgenstein saw things that 
his colleagues didn't see."12 (In "Was der Fall ist, der Tractatus", 2014, he pays tribute 
to his pioneering achievements in informatics, which is also Zemanek's (cf. Zemanek 
1993, abridged version 1 f.) viewpoint.)
 
A third treatise – again with a different modus operandi – will take us right back to 
this paper's point of departure, i.e., to "Einsteins Schleier". As neither Zeilinger's 
book nor its analysis in Czasny's work on the epistemology of physics are available in 
English, it will be necessary to first deal with those passages which finally lead to 
Zeilinger's new version of Tractatus 1, and to subsequently follow Czasny's train of 
thought which results in his refutation of Zeilinger's reformulation.
In the last chapter, after a highly accomplished introduction into quantum physics, 
Zeilinger – like other seekers of a foundational conceptual principle for quantum 
mechanics before him – moves on to quantum information and from there to a 
metaphysics of "informational immaterialism" (Timpson 2013, 1).13 His cogitations 
head for two pivotal statements about "reality", i.e., the (quantized) "world", and 
about (quantized) "information" (Zeilinger 2003, 225 f.): his *"radical suggestion"* 
that "Wirklichkeit und Information sind dasselbe" (*"Reality and information are the 
same"*), and – as a consequence – his new version of Tractatus 1. However, the 
chain of arguments leading to these verdicts is somewhat problematic: firstly, because 
of the inconsistent exegeses of the term "information" and its factual equalization 
with "reality" (*"This is a hypothesis which […] will hardly bear philosophical 
analysis"* – Pirner 2003, 11), and secondly, because of the fuzzy use of the word 
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"Wirklichkeit" (*"whatever that may be"* – Zeilinger 2003, 213), under which he 
unfortunately subsumes both reality and actuality. A more precise terminology would 
certainly have been advantageous in this context: "[…] in the quantum domain […] 
Leibniz' and Kant's distinction of reality and actuality is helpful." (Falkenburg 2007, 
20)
Czasny, for his part – he actually praises "Einsteins Schleier" as *"extremely 
stimulating"* (Czasny 2014, 8) – provides an astute analysis of the epistemological 
problems, argumentation patterns, and reflection deficits of quantum physics in 
general, and then proceeds to specify his elucidations by means of this book – a 
circumstance highly conducive to this paper. To begin with, he points to Zeilinger's 
indecisiveness between *"a materialism in the shape of an ontology of information 
and its subjectivist antithesis, a constructivism of information"* (Czasny 2014, 14), 
then analyzes the two terms "reality" and "actuality", and comes to the conclusion 
that reality is the more comprehensive term, as it contains both what is real or just 
possible for us, plus "those aspects of the object which are beyond our information of 
it and our interaction with it" (Czasny 2014, 29). Zeilinger's reformulation of 
Tractatus 1 shows *"that Zeilinger fades out the very two aspects that are so decisive 
for the subject-object relationship, thus reducing the world to the polarity between the 
subjectively actual, which is constituted by our observations and propositions on the 
one hand, and – on the other hand – that which is, in the light of our propositions, 
merely possible […]"* (Czasny 2014, 29, footnote 22). By means of the foregoing 
criticisms and the following deliberations and quotations he can demonstrate that 
Zeilinger's amendment to Tractatus 1 is redundant:
He first elucidates the depiction of the aspect of actuality (i.e., that which is the case) 
in the Tractatus by means of five sentences (1, 1.1, 2, 2.01, and 2.021) and then "the 
aspect of possibility, which (inter alia) is dealt with in the following three 
paragraphs":
2.0123 If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs.
(Everyone of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the object.) A 
new possibility cannot be discovered later.
2.0124 If all objects are given, then at the same time all possible states of affairs are 
also given.
2.014 Objects contain the possibility of all situations.
 Czasny concludes:
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*"The objects, on the one hand, belong to the actual (= existing) world (and 
even constitute its substance), and on the other hand – by their very 'nature' – 
they also contain all possibilities of their occurrence; therefore, for the 
Tractatus, all possible worlds belong to the world just like the actual world 
itself."*14 
This thought is expressed similarly by Goppelsröder (2007, 19): *"Beyond their 
character as coordinates in logical space, the objects constitute the 'substance of the 
world'"*, which is the reason why *"always one of many potentialities is actualized, 
while the others remain possible."*
7. Quantum theory and the later Wittgenstein
As of 1927, Wittgenstein exchanged ideas with Schlick not only in writing but face to 
face. *"Schlick probably began to study quantum physics in the mid-1910s"* 
(Schlick 2009, 394, editor's footnote 99). His Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre of 1918 
included quantum physics, revised and enlarged in the second edition of 1925.
Wittgenstein's acquaintance with Dirac and Freeman Dyson in Cambridge remained 
inconsequential, but he made friends with the physicist W. H. Watson, "who attended 
some of Wittgenstein's classes and met with him privately occasionally in the 
academic years 1929-30 and 1930-1." (McGuinness 2012, 192) Their friendship and 
correspondence ("My Dear Watson", "My Dear Wittgenstein") endured for many 
years. Just to cite one example, from Watson's letter to Wittgenstein of 29.12.1932: 
"If I had had a copy I should like to have sent you Max Planck's lecture on 'The 
concept of causality' – it is recorded in the Proceedings of the Physical Society of 
London, September 1932: it is marvellously muddled." (McGuinness 2012, 206) 
Despite the ironical twist, the message is clear: Watson knows that this is a piece of 
information Wittgenstein will definitely appreciate.
The fact that Wittgenstein actually did reflect on quantum theory in those years 
becomes apparent in MS 105, 3f. (1929!) of the Nachlass: After some remarks and 
considerations on the grammar of phenomenology and about physics, he writes: 
*"Physics has a language, and in this language it says sentences. These sentences can 
be true or false. […] But this matter looks more difficult due to the use of the 
terminology of mathematics. If, e.g., science is in doubt whether the observed 
phenomena can be described correctly by means of the theory of electrons or by 
quantum theory, is seems at first glance as if it were a decision concerning 
grammar."* (Note: In such contexts, the German noun "Satz" can be translated as 
"sentence" or as "proposition", and therefore it can quite naturally collocate both with 
language and with physics.)
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In 1938 Watson published his first great work, On Understanding Physics, "making 
much use of Wittgenstein's teaching" (McGuinness 2012, 192) and giving wide rein 
to quantum physics. It is hardly conceivable that Wittgenstein talked about quantum 
physics neither with Schlick (cf. Kusch 2014) nor with Watson: "So here in that book 
by Watson BOTH the TLP and Wittgenstein's later work is associated with a view on 
how quantum physics grew from an analogy with classical electrodynamics." 
(Brock)15 This "indebtedness to Wittgenstein" (McGuinness, 2012, 192) still holds 
true for the second edition of 1963 (Understanding Physics Today, CUP).
Also in 1929, Wittgenstein became acquainted with Piero Sraffa, a brilliant Italian 
economist, who exercised a "profound influence on Wittgenstein's development. […] 
Wittgenstein would arrange to meet him at least once a week for discussions". (Monk 
1991, 260) He was much interested in the implications of science for economics, but 
he was sceptical about the use of a Newtonian methodology. Therefore he took up 
quantum physics: "Sraffa read and annotated P. W. Bridgman's The Logic of Modern 
Physics (Bridgman, 1927) and referred to it in his papers." (Kurz and Salvadori, 
2005, 85) "In May 1946 Piero Sraffa decided he no longer wished to have 
conversations with Wittgenstein […]. This came as a great blow to Wittgenstein." 
(Monk 1991, 487) Again it is hard to imagine that in the seventeen years of their 
close acquaintance they never talked about quantum physics. Or more broadly, "it 
would be very strange if he never considered if the development of both quantum 
physics and the theory of relativity did or did not challenge his gradually changing 
views on the relationship between symbolism and experimental science. Since the 
development of physics in both cases involved a recognition of the observational 
practices of the physical experimentators, Wittgenstein might well have thought that 
his later philosophy was somehow in line with this recognition." (Brock 2006, 71)
But there is more than just circumstantial evidence. It can now be absolutely verified 
that in the 1930s Wittgenstein was in tune with modern physics, namely by means of 
a part of the Nachlass, the recently discovered and evaluated so-called Hidden 
Revision (Wittgenstein's preparatory work for the Philosophische Bemerkungen/ 
Philosophical Remarks), as presented in a video recording of a high-calibre lecture by 
Edwards-McKie, 2014, where she elucidates – among others – Wittgenstein's 
concepts of time, space, infinity, indeterminacy, indeterminism, action-at-a-distance, 
infinite divisibility, etc., and "his precursor ideas to entanglement as an indeterminate 
system". She draws attention to his article "Some Remarks on Logical Form" (1929), 
which "sets the stage for the entanglement idea." After these "significant Nachlass-
discoveries over the past two years" Wittgenstein must be regarded not only as a 
significant philosopher of language and mathematics but also of physics: "At a deep 
level – when viewed through the Hidden Revision – the Philosophical Investigations 
have far more to say about mathematics and physics than has hitherto been thought." 
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(Edwards-McKie, 2014) And then she announces: "[I]n a projected book 
[Wittgensteinian approaches to the quantum level] for Cambridge University Press, I 
argue for a reappraisal of Wittgenstein's philosophy of physics." (Edwards-McKie 
2015, Abstract)
Mugur-Schächter, a theoretical physicist who aims to develop a transdisciplinary, 
general "formalized epistemology" with special regard to (and chiefly based on) 
quantum mechanics, is similarly enthused by a related aspect of "Some Remarks on 
Logical Form". Commenting on her "principle of individual spacetime mutual 
exclusion" ("P 10") (Mugur-Schächter 2002, 144), she states: "The quantum 
mechanical principle of 'complementarity' can be regarded as the realization of P10 
for the particular category of physical object-entities consisting of states of 
microsystems. […] What is impossible indeed is only the simultaneous realization of 
two mutually incompatible quantum mechanical measurements upon one given 
replica of the considered microstate." (ibid., 145)
 
Later, progressing to "dual spacetime mutual exclusion" (ibid., 228 f., footnote 20), 
she remarks on Wittgenstein's discussion of the two colliding propositions "Brown 
now sits in this chair"and "Jones now sits in this chair" (Wittgenstein 2015 b, 169 ff.): 
"[…] this kind of dual spacetime mutual exclusion cannot be expressed by a principle 
like P 10. But it is very striking indeed that – without benefiting of guidance by 
quantum mechanics, which in the present work led toward 'the ultimate analysis of 
the phenomena in question' – Wittgenstein as early as 1929 identified the decisive 
individualizing role played by spacetime in the factual mutual exclusions of two 
propositions […]." (ibid., 229, footnote 20 ctd.)
In 1933 – at a time when he had already turned away from the Tractatus –, the second 
impression of the bilingual edition, with corrections by Wittgenstein, appeared. As is 
well known, he rejected it for a number of reasons – but not for any exasperating 
deficits in quantum theory, with which, as shown above, he was definitely familiar by 
that time.
How else can one make sense of a Bayesian take on pure
quantum states than to explore the same paths as Wittgenstein in his book On Certainty?
(Christopher A. Fuchs, 2014, 812)
8. Wittgenstein's impact on current quantum theory
At least four modern approaches to quantum theory have utilized some of 
Wittgenstein's thoughts or been partly inspired by them:
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R. Omnès, one of the main representatives of the consistent histories interpretation of 
quantum mechanics, sometimes advertising itself as "Copenhagen done right", 
repeatedly refers to Wittgenstein in "The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics" with 
considerable appreciation. He summarizes at some length his "logical description of 
reality", as Wittgenstein's "approach is easily mimicked in the logical formulation of 
quantum mechanics. Wittgenstein's 'facts' are potential […]". He does so in order "to 
make sure that our own approach to reality and truth is significant from the 
standpoint of a valuable theory of knowledge". He points to the "existence in 
quantum mechanics of properties that cannot be 'facts' and cannot even be checked as 
being existent or not", which "also fits with a remark by Wittgenstein (Section 36 in 
his Philosophical Remarks […]), where he envisions the possibility of things that are 
neither existent nor nonexistent. This was a puzzle for philosophers." (Omnès 1994, 
540 f.)
Notably, the opposite number sentence for Philosophical Remarks 36, namely 
Philosophical Investigations 50 – "If everything that we call 'being' and 'non-being' 
consists in the existence and non-existence of connections between elements, it 
makes no sense to speak of an element's being (non-being) […]" – is quoted, by way 
of introduction, by David Mermin, a leading proponent of Quantum Bayesianism (or 
rather, of the more radical QBism, which evolved from it), in "What Is Quantum 
Mechanics Trying to Tell Us [1]". (Mermin 1998, 2)
But Wittgenstein's most ardent adherent among QBists is Christopher A. Fuchs, one 
of the founders of QBism, as documented in the following and many other references 
in his massive paper (de facto, a collection of scientific letters to and from 
colleagues), "My Struggles With the Block Universe": "Actually Wittgenstein has 
become my latest addiction. In preparation for writing my new paper with Schack – 
one that we've been tentatively calling 'On Quantum Certainty' – I thought I should 
read Wittgenstein's book 'On Certainty' […]. Within the first five pages of that 90 
page book, he already said all that Rüdiger and I ever wanted to say and just kept 
going. Here is a man who, 52 years ago, could have tackled the Penrose question 
head on: How a pure quantum state can be epistemic and yet still give probability one 
predictions for some measurements?" (Fuchs 2014, 793 f.)
And finally, a most remarkable passage from a study on "EPR-type correlations from 
the perspective of the relational interpretation of quantum mechanics", expounding "a 
novel point of view on quantum theory, denoted Relational Quantum Mechanics 
(RQM)" (Smerlak/Rovelli 2008, 1): Its authors employ four significant sentences 
from the ontology-section of the Tractatus to explicate the central point of their 
theory. After explaining what they call "Einstein realism", they state:
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"RQM departs from such strict realism. In RQM, physical reality is taken to be 
formed by the individual (facts3) through which interacting systems (objects4) affect 
one another. Quantum events are therefore assumed to exist only in interactions5 and 
(this is the central point) the character of each quantum event is only relative to the 
system involved in the interaction." (Smerlak/Rovelli 2008, 2)
In three footnotes, they specify the three Tractarian catchwords "facts", "objects", and 
"interactions", namely:
3 "1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things"
4 "2.01 An atomic fact is a combination of objects (entities, things). 2.011 It is 
essential to a thing that it can be a constituent part of an atomic fact"
5 "2.0121 There is no object that we can imagine excluded from the possibility of 
combining with others" – thus translating Tractarian notions into corresponding 
aspects of a bold and still young quantum interpretation that regards the quantum 
mechanical description of reality as complete. This reality, however, may be different 
for different observers – which "is the idea at the basis of RQM." (Smerlak/Rovelli 
2008, 9)16
Vongehr, in a discussion of his paper "Realism escaping Wittgenstein's Silence: […]" 
(2012), gives strong support to Rovelli and Smerlak: "Wittgenstein's role is ever more 
re-appreciated, see for example the pioneers of Relational Quantum Mechanics that 
resolved EPR […]. One needs to understand the core of Wittgenstein, not focus on 
his choice of words at the time or suchlike."
Friederich (2011, 2015), who "favors what he calls a therapeutic approach to 
interpreting quantum theory", took "his cue from the later philosophy of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein". (Healey 2016, 17) In the spirit of the "Philosophical Investigations" 
(see, for instance, §§ 116, 133, 255), it applies Wittgenstein's "radically innovative 
conception of philosophy" of "dissolving philosophical problems" (Friederich 2015, 
6) to quantum theory, namely by analyzing "practices ('forms of life') in which these 
problems seem to arise" (Friederich 2011, 3, footnote 12) and in which the language-
game of quantum theory is embedded. He starts by enquiring whether, e.g., the 
measurement problem might not arise "from a distorted perspective on how the 
quantum theoretical formalism connects to physical reality" and whether "the 
foundational problems might not vanish after certain conceptual presuppositions […] 
have been corrected" (Friederich 2015, 49), and advocates the Wittgensteinian 
concept of a "dissolution of the measurement problem, contrasting it with that of a 
solution" (ibid., 8) by showing that quantum states do not represent any objective 
features of reality but rather reflect "the epistemic conditions of those who assign 
them" (ibid., 7).
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9. Some closing remarks
The impetus to this paper was given mainly by Zeilinger's pronouncement that 
Wittgenstein was a "naive philosopher of classical physics" and his critical 
juxtaposition of Tractatus 1 with his own special version of it in "Einsteins Schleier" 
for final effect. As a proponent of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics, 
Zeilinger states in his book that it is not possible to make a statement about the 
properties of a particle before observation – in other words, *"it is senseless to talk 
about things that are principally unknowable"* (Zeilinger 2003, 167). Wittgenstein, 
in Tractatus 7, expressed a very similar thought almost a century ago, and in a deeper 
sense at that. It is demonstrably quoted, for good reason, over and over not only in 
connection with the Copenhagen interpretation: Smerlak (2006, 26), e.g., in an 
explanation of the concept of locality in RQM ("[…] locality constitutes […] the base 
of the relational methodology: an observer must not, and cannot, account for events 
involving systems located out of its causal neighborhood […]") remarks: "We can 
take this observation as an echo in fundamental physics of the celebrated: 'Whereof 
one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." (ibid., footnote 4) And very probably, 
Tractatus 7 inspired John Bell to title his collected writings "Speakable and 
Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics" (1987).
Tractatus 7 would surely have made an excellent closing sentence also in Zeilinger's 
"Einsteins Schleier".
Philosophy begins where physics ends,
and vice versa.
 (Sean Carroll, 2014)
10. Conclusions
Contrary to conventional wisdom, Wittgenstein's thinking did definitely not persist 
within the bounds of classical physics. Proof of an abundance of citations in the 
Nachlass plus compelling circumstantial evidence confirm that Wittgenstein was 
knowledgeable in the theory of relativity. As for quantum theory, already in the 
Tractatus some central concepts can be shown to contain affinities to it. Thoughs 
from several of his works even inspired certain aspects of current interpretations of 
quantum theory.
Zeilinger's supposedly corrective "quantum mechanical amendment" to Tractatus 1 – 
the starting point of this paper – is exposed as a mere condensation of thoughts that 
are stated anyway in the course of the Tractatus, and is therefore redundant.
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ANNOTATIONS
Note: The paper in hand is an extended and improved version of the German original, 
"Zeilinger, Wittgenstein und die moderne Physik oder Wie naiv war Wittgenstein?"
http://www.information-philosophie.de/?a=1&t=8401&n=2&y=5&c=29, and of the 
first and second versions submitted to philpapers.org
1 All of the author's translations from German to English are marked with asterisks
2 To name but a few examples:
Albert, David: On the Origin of Everything
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/25/books/review/a-universe-from-nothing-by-
lawrence-m-krauss.html?_r=0
Carroll, Sean: Philosophy Begins Where Physics Ends, and Vice Versa
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/the-curious-wavefunction/philosophy-begins-
where-physics-ends-and-vice-versa/
Carroll, Sean: Physicists Should Stop Saying Silly Things about Philosophy
http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/06/23/physicists-should-stop-
saying-silly-things-about-philosophy/
Hsu, Steve: Does Philosophy Make You a Better Scientist?
http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2009/07/06/does-philosophy-make-you-
a-better-scientist/
Norris, Christopher: Hawking contra Philosophy
https://philosophynow.org/issues/82/Hawking_contra_Philosophy   
Romano, Carlin: Cosmology, Cambridge Style: Wittgenstein, Toulmin, and Hawking
http://www.chronicle.com/article/Cosmology-Cambridge-Style-/124568/
3 Private communication from Oskari Kuusela: August 29, 2017
The complete sentence reads as follows: "I completely agree that the record for 
Wittgenstein's views on science should be corrected."
4 *"Einstein's Veil: The New World of Quantum Physics"*. The word "veil" refers to 
Einstein's classic words about de Broglie's doctoral thesis of 1924: "He has lifted a 
corner of the great veil."
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5 Zeilinger's numbering is erroneous; it should be Tractatus 1!
6 Zeilinger's "too narrow" ("zu beschränkt") is strikingly reminiscent of Heisenberg's 
"too narrow" in the famous interview about quantum theory and language 
http://www.fdavidpeat.com/interviews/heisenberg.ht  m : "In the Tractatus, which I 
thought too narrow, he always thought that words have a well-defined meaning." But 
also Heisenberg is wrong: For normal language, Wittgenstein's use-theory of meaning 
applies already for the Tractatus (3.261 f., 3.3, 3.326, 3.314. 3.326, 3.328 ….)
7 http://derstandard.at/1319182381584/Wittgenstein-Memorial-Symposium-zum-60-
Todestag-des-Philosophen (article not signed by name)
8 "'The world is everything that is the case.' This is a classical viewpoint, a quantum 
state goes beyond. It represents all possibilities of everything that could be the case." 
(Zeilinger 1999a, S296)
 "In quantum mechanics, we cannot make statements about what is the case, but only 
statements about what could be the case." (As quoted in Pirner 2015, 59)
9 Ironically, the romantically irrational and anti-scientist Zeitgeist of the bourgeois-
academic milieu of the Weimar Republic, with its rejection of determinism and 
causality – embodied in the powerful, if multi-faceted ideology of Lebensphilosophie 
– may have contributed considerably to the success of quantum physics in the 1920s. 
These tendencies also influenced Wittgenstein's thinking, which can already be 
noticed in several sentences in the Tractatus dealing with "life" (Goeres 2000, 199). 
Paul Forman's controversial externalist theses, which postulate a causal correlation 
between this Weltanschauung and the development of quantum physics surely apply 
to a certain degree but probably cannot be upheld in a strict sense. (Zoehrer 2016, 60-
81)
10 Zeilinger's pronouncement (*"a naive philosopher of classical physics"*) before the 
Austrian Academy of Sciences in November 2011 is probably based on Stenholm's 
book (published in September 2011), although no such strong wording could be 
found there; its jacket boasts a glowing recommendation ("a really unique book") by 
Zeilinger. It should be kept in mind that the book is only about quantum physics and 
not about relativity theory, which is also part of modern physics.
11 Private communication: email August 13, 2015
(Note that Brock co-published a Wittgensteinian account of modern physics which 
has actually been used in experiments at CERN:
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Brock, Steen and Harré, Rom 2016: Nature's affordances and formation length: The 
ontology of quantum physical experiments, SATS Northern European Journal of 
Philosophy 
https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/sats.2016.17.issue-2/issue-files/sats.2016.17.issue-
2.xml
12 Private communication: email August 17, 2015
13 There is another irony here: 
Timpson, according to David Wallace one of the relatively few Wittgensteinians "in 
very science-oriented philosophy", whose "book on quantum information is heavily 
influenced by Wittgensteinian ideas" ("Wittgenstein's neglect", comment No. 15 by 
David Wallace, http://www.newappsblog.com/2013/06/wittgensteins-neglect-1.html), 
explains in his discussion of "two distinct formulations" of Zeilinger‘s "Foundational 
Principle for Quantum Mechanics" (Zeilinger 1999b) that "Zeilinger‘s approach here 
bears marked similarities to Wittgenstein's views in the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus" (Timpson 2013, 153, footnote 128)! (Author's note: especially 
Tractatus 4.2 – 4.2211; Timpson refers to the fact that Zeilinger's Foundational 
Principle is highly reminiscent of Wittgenstein's "elementary propositions describing 
basic objects".) For the sake of completeness, it should be added that Timpson 
uncovers various pitfalls and confusions in the current debate in general, and
that despite Zeilinger's baffling nod to Wittgenstein, he does not seem to be very 
much taken with Zeilinger's quantum philosophical cogitations. 
14 Private communication: email August 18, 2015
15 Private communication: email August 13, 2015 
16 In a Wittgenstein-inspired paper like Smerlak/Rovelli's, a sentence such as "Reality 
may be different for different observers" is necessarily reminiscent of the early 
Wittgenstein's solipsism as developed in the Tractatus, 5.6 – 5.641. But Rovelli 
vehemently rejects even the faintest reproach of solipstic tendencies in RQM here 
(2008, p.6) and elsewhere (e.g., "ridiculous philosophical views like Berkelian 
Idealism or outright solipsism", as quoted in Bernard d' Espagnat and Hervé Zwirn 
(eds.), The Quantum World: Philosophical Debates on Quantum Physics, 2017, 
p.202). And yet, it seems to remain a disquieting notion to some quantum thinkers of 
various ilks, who thus try to circumvent their predicament by introducing terms like 
"multisolipsism", "convivial solipsism", and the like.
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